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 This thesis is meant to examine the influence of U.S. security partnerships on 
Latin American nations. With four major partnerships created in the past fifteen years, it 
is important to review the successes and failures of these relationships, and see what 
improvements can be made.  Each chapter examines a different partnership, as well as its 
effect on the partner countries and the region.  Chapter One focuses on Plan Colombia 
and the balloon effect in South America.  It argues that Plan Colombia played a part in 
the balloon effect in Latin America.  It did this by observing drug-related crime rates in 
Colombia, as well as drug-related crime in surrounding states.  While not causation, the 
data showed Plan Colombia likely played a part in the balloon effect’s presence in South 
America, with neighboring state Peru now the world’s cocaine capital. 
Chapter Two covers the Mérida Initiative and the United States’ fear of spillover 
crime from Mexico.  This chapter explored whether or not the Mérida Initiative was a 
preemptive or reactive effort from the United States. It did this by reviewing crime rates 
on both sides of the border in relation to Mérida funding, and estimated the sustainability 
of the programs once funding ceased.  The data showed that while crime did reduce with 
Mérida funding, the sustainability was limited after funding stopped.  
Chapter Three reviews both the Central America Regional Security Initiative as 
well as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and examines the effect of a hegemon’s 
relationship with a weaker power.  This was done by observing crime rates over time, as 
well as other state concerns such as debt as percentage of GDP, unemployment rates, and 
GDP per capita, to see how partner countries fared in areas other than security while 
receiving funds.  The data showed mixed results, as some countries showed a decrease in 
unemployment and crime, while others showed drastic increases in debt as percentage of 
GDP, unemployment rates, and even crime.  Overall, this thesis shows the limited scope 
and reactive efforts of U.S. security partnerships in Latin America, and how they have 
affected the region over the past fifteen years. 
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 The United States has been involved with Latin American affairs for decades. 
Recently, however, the U.S. has significantly increased its support of security-related 
efforts through regional and individual partnerships.  Over the last fifteen years, the U.S. 
has allocated billions of dollars (a fraction of the funding committed by partner countries) 
to Latin American states to improve security and provide stability to the region.  
However, there are currently few measures in place gauging the success of these 
programs, and more importantly, their overall effect on the region.  This thesis attempts 
to examine that effect by reviewing four of the United States’ largest security 
partnerships in Latin America over the past fifteen years:  Plan Colombia, the Mérida 
Initiative, the Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin 
Security Initiative. 
 Chapter One reviews the effects of Plan Colombia, and explores the theory of the 
balloon effect.  The balloon effect is a theory suggesting that increased security and 
counternarcotic efforts in a specific region will inspire transnational organized drug 
traffickers to relocate to a position easier to evade eradication and interdiction efforts – 
effectively, squeezing the balloon on one end forces the air to the other end
1
.  To evaluate 
this, data was gathered on the relation of U.S. funding to crime rates in Colombia, as well 
as in surrounding states.  The results showed a correlation, suggesting the balloon effect 
                                                        
1 Whittington, Liam. "The Balloon Effect, In Effect: Humala, Peru, and the Drug Dilemma (Part 2 of 2)." 
  Council on Hemispheric Affairs. http://www.coha.org/the-balloon-effect-and-displacement-part 
  -2-of-2/  
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may indeed be present in South America due to the efforts of Plan Colombia, as Peru 
(Colombia’s neighbor) is now the cocaine capital of the world
2
. 
 Chapter Two examines the Mérida Initiative, and whether or not U.S. 
involvement was reactive or preemptive.  This is important because a reactive effort 
based off fear of spillover crime may not be as well conceived as a preventative effort 
meant to provide long-term stability.  To study this, data was gathered on crime rates 
from towns on both sides of the border in relation to Mérida funding over time.  While 
crime rates did diminish overall, the sustainability of the programs was questionable due 
to the limited time frame of U.S. support. 
 Chapter Three covers both the Central America Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).  The goals of this chapter 
were to examine the effects of asymmetrical partnerships between a hegemon and weaker 
powers.  This was done by reviewing the effect of U.S. security funding on crime rates 
over time, as well as its effects on economic concerns such as debt as percent of GDP and 
unemployment rates. The data showed mixed results, as some states showed 
improvements in unemployment and GDP per capita, while others showed an increase in 
crime, increase in debt as percent of GDP, and an increase in unemployment.  Further 
research must be conducted to understand the long-term implications for the states, as 
CARSI and CBSI are still ongoing programs. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not U.S. security efforts in 
Latin America have been successful thus far, and if they can be successful long-term 
                                                        
2 McDermott, Jeremy. "4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer – InSight Crime | 
  Organized Crime in the Americas." 4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer 
 - InSight Crime Organized Crime in the Americas. http://www.insightcrime.org/news  
  -analysis/why-peru-top-cocaine-producer (accessed January 1, 2014). 
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(including after funding has ceased).  Further, this thesis can be used to compare against 
future research in security partnerships.  The multilateral relationships between the US 
and Latin American states provide multiple examples of security partnerships to be 
reviewed, and compared with security efforts made between states across the globe. With 
billions of dollars having already been allocated, it is important to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of these programs for future efforts, and perhaps indicate 
possible augmentations to the current ones.  The lack of measures by the U.S. 
Department of State makes continued research on these partnerships even more crucial.   
Latin America is home to some of the United States’ most important 
relationships, however U.S. security partnerships thus far have not reflected that level of 
prominence.  They have largely been unsuccessful, and though some immediate goals 
have been met, their sustainability is limited. This thesis hopes to provide an 
understanding of what can be improved upon in U.S. security partnerships, and to be a 












Chapter One: Plan Colombia 
 
Research Question: How has Plan Colombia influenced the balloon effect in Latin 
American drug trafficking practices? 
 
Introduction 
 The illicit drug trade is one of the largest industries in the world, and Latin 
America represents one of the largest producers and traffickers within that industry, 
supplying the majority of drugs flowing into the United States, the United Kingdom, as 
well as domestically in Latin America
3
. South America, specifically, has been responsible 
for some of the world’s largest cocaine producers, supplying most of the world’s cocaine 
demand for the past three decades
4,5
.  In today’s market Peru is considered the world’s 
largest cocaine producer, according to the United Nations. This is, however, a very recent 
change, with Colombia holding the title until 2013. This has led many political scientists 
and drug trade researchers to ask – what is responsible for the switch
6,7
?  There are a 
number of theories, but one has led to a polarizing discussion of U.S. foreign aid in Latin 
America – the balloon effect.  
                                                        
3 United Nations. "UNODC - Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean." United Nations Office of 
  Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/mexico- central-america-and-
  the-caribbean.html   
4 Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress.” Congressional 
  Research Service: Report (August 9, 2013): 1-33. 
5 Aviles, William. 2008. "US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations." Bulletin Of 
  Latin American Research 27, no. 3: 410-429. 
6 Neumann, Vanessa. 2006. "The Incoherence of US Counternarcotics Policy in Colombia: Exploring the 
  Breaches in the Policy Cycle." European Journal Of Development Research 18, no. 3: 412-434. 
7 McDermott, Jeremy. "4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer – InSight Crime | 
  Organized Crime in the Americas." 4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer 
 - InSight Crime Organized Crime in the Americas. http://www.insightcrime.org/news  
  -analysis/why-peru-top-cocaine-producer (accessed January 1, 2014). 
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 The balloon effect is a theory suggesting that increased security and 
counternarcotic efforts in a specific region will inspire transnational organized drug 
traffickers to relocate to a position easier to evade eradication and interdiction efforts – 
effectively, squeezing the balloon on one end forces the air to the other end
8
. The balloon 
effect, however, cannot occur naturally (e.g., increased cost of production or decreased 
demand); it requires an external actor to be the one “squeezing the balloon.” This theory 
has been applied all over the world, from Latin America to Eastern Europe, but no one as 
of yet has been able to provide data strong enough to prove causation
9
. It exists, 
primarily, as just a theory. There is, however, no shortage of supporting evidence.  
 The balloon effect in Latin America is a concept that has become regularly 
contested, but its supporters believe it has major policy and strategy implications for U.S. 
foreign aid
10
.  Those that do support it believe that due to the actions of external actors 
such as military or law enforcement, drug-trafficking organizations are forced to move 
elsewhere to continue business, but are not eradicated.  The balloon effect’s opponents, 
however, argue that it is impossible establish it as a cause, and the geographic change is 
likely due to either product demand, or agricultural conditions.  
The U.S. has allocated billions of dollars to fund regional security initiatives in 
Latin America over the past two and a half decades, and if a theory suggests that all they 
have managed to do is push the problem around rather than clean it up, American 
                                                        
8 Whittington, Liam. "The Balloon Effect, In Effect: Humala, Peru, and the Drug Dilemma (Part 2 of 2)." 
  Council on Hemispheric Affairs. http://www.coha.org/the-balloon-effect-and-displacement-part 
  -2-of-2/  
9 Charles, Robert B. 2005. "2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report." DISAM Journal Of 
  International Security Assistance Management 27, no. 3: 60-64. 
10 Madsen, Kenneth D. 2007. "Local Impacts of the Balloon Effect of Border Law Enforcement."  
  Geopolitics 12, no. 2: 280-298.  
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taxpayers would be very unhappy
11
.  This would indicate a strong need for a new 
strategic direction as well as the development of new policy. To be clear, this is a review 
solely of law enforcement, security, and rule of law efforts in Colombia to combat drug 
trafficking networks. This will not review all aspects of U.S. foreign aid to the state. 
 Plan Colombia began as a counternarcotic/counterinsurgency effort by President 
Andrés Pastrana in 1999 primarily focused on combating the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and developing the rule of law in FARC occupied 
regions
12,13
.  Following an embrace of “neoliberalism” by the Colombian government, 
significantly hurting the national agricultural economy, many farmers in the region, 
especially those in the regions of the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN), began 
growing the more profitable crops of coca and opium poppies
14
. This led to one of the 
sharpest increases in illicit narcotics production and distribution in Colombian history, 
causing President Pastrana to create and sign Plan Colombia into law
15
. Shortly 
thereafter, the United States began heavily assisting these programs with added funding, 
much needed equipment, and training, through an aid package signed into law by 
President Bill Clinton in 2000
16,17
.  This was primarily done because Colombia was 
responsible for the majority of cocaine crossing into the United States, and subsequently 
                                                        
11 Foreign Assistance. "ForeignAssistance.gov." ForeignAssistance.gov.    
  http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/default.aspx  
12 Hylton, Forrest. 2010. "Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success." Brown Journal Of World Affairs 17, 
  no. 1: 99-115.  
13 Aviles, William. 2008. "US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations." Bulletin Of 
  Latin American Research 27, no. 3: 410-429.  
14 Ibid 
15 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
16 Ibid  
17 Aviles, William. 2008. "US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations." Bulletin Of 
  Latin American Research 27, no. 3: 410-429. 
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marked one of the U.S.’s largest moments in their “war on drugs”
 18,19,20
.  Much of U.S. 
involvement focused on rule of law efforts, military training, and funding for anti-drug 
programs, though human rights, health, and economic reforms were also supported
21
. 
 Since Plan Colombia’s creation, many of its critics believed there was not a well-
enough defined long-term strategy
22
.  Americans, as well as the states surrounding 
Colombia, wanted to know what the U.S. planned to do if, to evade eradication and 
interdiction, the existing drug trafficking networks relocated
23
.  Those concerns were 
never fully addressed at the time, and now the status quo of the drug trade in Latin 
America has significantly shifted, with Peru becoming the world’s largest cocaine 
producer in 2012
24
. This is where the theory of the balloon effect has come into play.  
The theory suggests that because of a poor long-term strategy, focused primarily on 
eradicating drug trafficking networks from Colombia, the balloon has been squeezed at 
one end, and shifted the geographical dynamic of the players involved. 
                                                        
18 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
19 Beittel, June S. 2012. “U.S. Policy Focus and Concerns.” Congressional Research Service: Report 27 
 - 47. 
20 Crandall, Russell. 2006. "Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy." 48, no. 
 1: 192-195. 
21 Aviles, William. 2008. "US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations." Bulletin Of 
  Latin American Research 27, no. 3: 410-429. 
22 Windles, James, and Graham Farrell. 2012. “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law  
 Enforcement in Terms of Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis.” Substance 
 Use & Misuse 47, no. 8/9: 868-876.  
23 LeoGrande, William MoSharpe, Kenneth E. 2000. "Two Wars or One?." World Policy Journal 17, no. 3: 
 1.  
24 McDermott, Jeremy. "4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer – InSight Crime | 
  Organized Crime in the Americas." 4 Reasons Why Peru Became World's Top Cocaine Producer 
  - InSight Crime | Organized Crime in the Americas. http://www.insightcrime.org/news  
 -analysis/why-peru-top-cocaine-producer. 
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 The purpose of this chapter is mapping and identifying the validity of these 
concerns, and discerning whether or not the United States is responsible for introducing 
and/or influencing the balloon effect in Latin America. This produces the research 
question: how has Plan Colombia influenced the balloon effect in Latin American drug 
trafficking practices? For future policy concerns and considerations, it is necessary to 
understand if U.S. programs in Latin America have been successful, or simply, successful 
only in moving the problem from one area to another.  
To do this, multiple facets of the balloon effect, and its possible presence, will be 
reviewed.  It will be necessary to examine and consider the prevailing theories on the 
balloon effect and the successes and failures of Plan Colombia (both for and against).  
Subsequently, using these theories, hypotheses will be created to guide and focus the 
direction of this work. The methodology for the collection and study of the data will be 
explained in detail, followed by the examination of said data.  The results of this data will 
be presented with accompanying visual representations, as well as explanations for the 
meaning of the results. Following this discussion, a conclusion consisting of a summary, 
hypothesis review, and recommendations will be presented. 
 
Literature Review 
 There is no shortage of literature on drug trafficking networks and U.S. foreign 
aid in Latin America. While many of these works focus primarily on the efficacy of these 
programs, there is a significant amount of literature reviewing the balloon effect’s 
presence in the Western Hemisphere. The literature produced thus far has reached a 
general consensus on three possible reasons for the symptoms of the balloon effect to 
 9 
occur in Latin America.  These are an influx of unrelated incidents, the efforts of the 
Colombian government and regional partners (not including the United States), and U.S. 
involvement via Plan Colombia
25,26,27,28,29
.  However, it must first be established that the 
balloon effect is a viable theory, and can be proven; and, if proven, can have any 
influence on the geographical dynamic of organized crime.  These steps include: proving 
the balloon effect’s existence, prevalence, and ultimately, who is responsible 
(culpability).  It is important to note that the existence section will present research on the 
validity of the balloon effect as a general theory, not its existence in Latin America. This 
will be broached later as part of the hypothesis. Prevalence relates to researchers’ 
attempts to discern the balloon effect’s responsibility for any regional changes in drug-
trafficking practices. The prevalence section is one of the most difficult aspects of the 
balloon effect to establish with any specificity, and thus, is a primary criticism of 
culpability. Culpability will attempt to establish the means to identify those responsible 
for creating a balloon effect, as well as literature asserting culpability in Latin America.   
 
Existence 
One of the primary criticisms of the balloon effect is its manner of establishing 
fault.  Some researchers believe no single actor or organization can be responsible for the 
                                                        
25 Friesendorf, Cornelius. 2005. “Squeezing the balloon?” Crime, Law & Social Change 44, no. 1:  35-78.  
26 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Beittel, June S. 2012. “U.S. Policy Focus and Concerns.” Congressional Research Service: Report 27 
 - 47. 
29 Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress.” Congressional 




.  They assert that the origins of such dramatic structural and geographical 
changes in organized crime arise from myriad possibilities that cannot be traced to a 
specific instigator. This makes it very difficult to establish the balloon effect as a 
legitimate theory. If one cannot establish a significant connection between an external 
force and the cause for drug-trafficking organizations to augment their structure and 
procedure, then the balloon effect loses the possibility of being proven.  This serves as 
the null hypothesis for the balloon effect theory as a whole. 
An opposing theory developed by researchers Rouse and Arce in their work, The 
Drug-Laden Balloon, states that the balloon effect does have legitimacy, and that it is 
possible to track its influence through raw data and an established timeline of events
31
.   
Critics of Rouse and Arce
32
 argue that one ultimately cannot claim to know a causal 
reason without confirming these changes with Cartel leadership (e.g., asking if they 
moved because of increased law enforcement or supply and demand concerns).  This has 
met with its own criticism as this option is generally viewed as impossible, but is, 
however, no less legitimate. Clearly, though, it is not an option for most researchers, who 
must solely rely on the data available to them.  Because of these reasons, it is impossible 
to prove the balloon effect, as a theory, to be 100% accurate. For the purposes of this 
thesis, though, it will be assumed the balloon effect is a legitimate theory, and will be 
considered with regard to causal reasons for changes in Latin American drug-trafficking 
practices. 
                                                        
30 Windles, James, and Graham Farrell. 2012. “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law  
  Enforcement in Terms of Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis.” Substance 
  Use & Misuse 47, no. 8/9: 868-876.  
31 Rouse, Stella M., and Moises Arce. 2006. “The Drug-Laden Balloon: U.S. Military Assistance and Coca 
  Production in the Central Andes.” Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 3: 540-557.  
32 Windles, James, and Graham Farrell. 2012. “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law  
  Enforcement in Terms of Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis.” Substance 




Once the balloon effect is established, its prevalence must be assessed in order to 
understand who or what is responsible for the changes (though the “why” can be 
assumed, it is impossible to confirm without the actors involved).  There has been much 
research of late on the balloon effect’s responsibility for the drug trade’s changing 
geographical presence
33
. This is a very difficult factor to quantify, as tracking 
responsibility through data doesn’t provide everything one would need to come to a 
strong conclusion.   
However, some researchers have presented datasets and arguments stating that the 
balloon effect is not responsible for many of these changes
34
.  In Windles and Farrell 
2012 work, “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law Enforcement in Terms of 
Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis,” they presented data 
suggesting the efforts of law enforcement are sometimes less of a factor than changing 
economic markets, agricultural concerns, and competition in forcing drug-trafficking 
organizations to migrate. 
On the other hand, data provided by the United States government suggests that 
the balloon effect has a large effect on these migration patterns
35,36,37
.  This is not 
                                                        
33 Friesendorf, Cornelius. 2005. “Squeezing the balloon?” Crime, Law & Social Change 44, no. 1:  35-78. 
34 Windles, James, and Graham Farrell. 2012. “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law  
  Enforcement in Terms of Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis.” Substance 
  Use & Misuse 47, no. 8/9: 868-876. 
35 Beittel, June S. 2012. “U.S. Policy Focus and Concerns.” Congressional Research Service: Report 27
 -47. 
36 Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress.” Congressional 
  Research Service: Report (August 9, 2013): 1-33.  
37 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
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believed to be reporting bias, and will not be considered as such for the sake of this 
thesis.  This data shows that much of the change made by drug-trafficking organizations 
in Latin America can be linked to the development of certain initiatives. Some examples 
of these are military training, improved equipment, enhanced judicial systems, corruption 
reduction, and the active eradication of illicit drug crop fields
38
.   
 
Culpability 
The most important aspect of assessing the balloon effect’s presence is 
establishing culpability.  While there are three primary reasons for the symptoms of the 
balloon effect to arise in Latin America, one effectively acts as a null hypothesis.  Some 
researchers believe the balloon effect occurs because of an influx of unrelated incidences, 
inspiring drug-trafficking organizations to migrate their operation
39
.  This theory 
ultimately removes the balloon effect from the equation according to its definition.  
Though the balloon effect will be considered established for the sake of this thesis, it 
must be proven that an external actor is responsible for its presence in Latin America. 
The second theory on culpability suggests that balloon effect would have occurred 
regardless of Plan Colombia’s implementation
40
.   This theory maintains that the efforts 
of Colombia and its regional partners would have caused the established trafficking 
organizations to migrate regardless of U.S. involvement.  At the time of Plan Colombia’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S.Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
38 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S.Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
39 Windles, James, and Graham Farrell. 2012. “Popping the Balloon Effect: Assessing Drug Law  
  Enforcement in Terms of Displacement, Diffusion, and the Containment Hypothesis.” Substance 
  Use & Misuse 47, no. 8/9: 868-876. 
40 Friesendorf, Cornelius. 2005. “Squeezing the balloon?” Crime, Law & Social Change 44, no. 1:  35-78.  
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introduction, efforts by Colombia and its regional partners in South America were 




The final theory of culpability in Latin America is that U.S. involvement via Plan 
Colombia established a balloon effect in Latin America
42,43
. Plan Colombia was a 
regional security partnership between the United States and Colombia, officially 
beginning in 2000 (the U.S. had been conducting efforts similar to Plan Colombia since 
1996)
44
.  This theory requires that the United States be largely responsible for the balloon 
effect’s introduction into Latin America.  Culpability is related to resource and strategy 
allocation to the Colombian government by the U.S., not direct involvement. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 In developing the hypotheses for this chapter, the theories on the balloon effect 
discussed by Rouse and Arce (2006), Friesendorf (2005), and Windles and Farrell (2012) 
will act as the guiding authority. These theories have lead to the consideration of three 
hypotheses.  They cannot be considered separately, as two are dependent on the first 
being confirmed.  Each hypothesis will be reviewed simultaneously through the lens of 
Plan Colombia. Using this as a case study for examining the hypotheses will allow all to 
be considered in unison. 
                                                        
41 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S.Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
42 Beittel, June S. 2012. “U.S. Policy Focus and Concerns.” Congressional Research Service: Report 27
 -47.   
43 Sullivan, Mark P. “Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress.” Congressional 





1.) The balloon effect is present in Latin America (e.g., an external actor is 
responsible for the shift in Latin American drug-trafficking practices). 
2.) The balloon effect has a large impact on the migration patterns of drug-trafficking 
organizations in Latin America. 
3.) U.S. involvement via Plan Colombia is responsible for the introduction of the 
balloon effect in Latin America. 
 
Methodology 
To provide an answer to the research question and sufficiently investigate the 
hypotheses, multiple datasets were examined.  Initially, data collected by the U.S. 
Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development was 
going to be analyzed to track drug-trafficking related crime reductions and increases.  
However, this data proved to be unreliable, as much of it was gathered via survey from 
local community members, and arrest and prosecution rates provided by the Colombian 
government
45
.  Local community members provided their perceived security and 
opinions on increases/decreases to drug-related crime.  The high possibility of reporting 
errors and misinformation made this data less reliable, but not unusable.  Perceived 
security can still prove useful in identifying change related to the balloon effect.   
                                                        
45 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
  Senate. [Washington, D.C.]: U.S.Govt. Accountability Office, 2008. 
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 Information provided by the Colombian government is potentially unreliable, as a 
large portion of Plan Colombia funding was intended to reduce corruption in government, 
improve the rule of law, and develop a more efficient judicial system
46
.  This, however, 
did not matter, as there is insufficient usable data from the Colombian government 
available. Also, an increase in drug-related convictions is not directly indicative of a 
drug-trafficking organization succumbing to the balloon effect.  It only signifies that 
more members of these syndicates are being subjected to the judicial system.  While this 
could play a factor in their relocation, it is not a causal relationship. This data, however, 
must still be considered and used as a reference point for the remaining data, despite its 
reliability concerns. 
 To adequately, and without biases, track the balloon effect and the U.S.’s role, it 
was decided to use the budgets of Plan Colombia by fiscal year to associate an increase in 
funding, equipment, and training to the displacement of drug-traffickers (this includes 
only the U.S. assistance budget for the reduction of illicit narcotics and the improvement 
of Colombian security, not the overall budget, or Colombian government’s 
contributions), through a breakdown of funding and progress in a report developed by the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Combining this information, 
and juxtaposing it with conviction rates by the Colombian judicial system, as well as the 
rate of successful eradication and interdiction efforts, led to a suitable method of 
identifying reduction.   
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However, that amasses to only half of the necessary parts to properly track 
displacement under the balloon effect.  It was also necessary to create a method of 
tracking increases in drug-related crime elsewhere in Latin America. To find an 
organized method, the mantra, “nature abhors a vacuum,” was followed.  Surrounding 
countries without any existing or substantial security/counternarcotic programs were 
examined for reports of increased drug-related crime from reliable sources.  Combining 
these two methods, reviewing the dates for both decreases of drug-related crime in 
Colombia, and increases in the immediate region, a useable method of tracking the 
balloon effect was formed. This data and method will be used to establish the balloon 
effect’s prevalence. 
To counterbalance this data, efforts conducted by the U.N. were also examined 
through the annual World Drug Report of the United Nations Office of Drugs and 
Crime
47
.  This data will be used to assist in identifying culpability, as described in the 
Literature Review section.  If data related to U.S. involvement shows a correlation 
between the increase/decrease of drug-related crime regionally (indicating the balloon 
effect’s validity), then data developed by the U.N. will be used to see if culpability can be 
assigned to any one actor. 
 
Data 
A report developed by the United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) for then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, 
largely confirmed by reports from the Colombian government, recounts in detail the 
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efforts of the United States to assist the Colombian government in their 
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts
48
.  This report consists of both a 
breakdown of U.S. assistance from 2000 through 2008, as well as its effect on heroin and 
cocaine production in Colombia.  In that time, the United States provided nearly $1.3 
billion to Colombia’s many rule of law and counternarcotics reforms, while heroin 
production dropped an estimated fifty percent, as can be seen in Figure 2
49
. This graph, 
representing heroin production in Colombia between 2000 and 2007, is the inverse of 
Figure 1, representing U.S. Plan Colombia funding for the reduction of illicit narcotics 
and the improvement of security. This shows exactly what it should. The more assistance 
Colombia received to combat drug trafficking networks, the less production of heroin 
there was in Colombia. However, if there were less U.S. assistance, heroin production 
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Figure 1. U.S. Plan Colombia Funding - Reduce Illicit 
Narcotics and Improve Security 
U.S. Plan Colombia






Cocaine production, however, showed a four percent increase in production 
between 2000 and 2007, as can be seen in Figure 3
51
.  This graph is a more accurate 
representation of how one would expect production patterns to react to the fluctuating 
levels of funding (though, there may be other factors at play such as cost of production, 
and supply and demand).  As in Figure 2, Figure 3 shows large spike in 2001, mirroring 
the drastic decrease in U.S. aid. However, where heroin production remained relatively 
flat between 2006 and 2007, cocaine reduction showed an increase, possibly in response 
to the decrease in U.S. foreign aid
52
. Both cocaine and heroin production rates, when 
compared to U.S. funding by fiscal year, support the hypotheses. 
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Figure 2. Heroin Production in Colombia:  







Conversely, Figure 4, representing the estimated exports of cocaine from 
Colombia to the United States between 2000 and 2007, shows unexpected results. While 
exports did increase between 2000 and 2002 (the inverse of U.S. funding), 2003 had a 
sharp decline in exports (from 500 down to 400 metric tons) even with a static rate of 
funding, and export rates every following year continually increased
53
.  This could be 
explained by saying drug traffickers were finding a way around the status quo, and once 
funding reduced again between 2006 and 2007, cocaine exports hit their peak with 700 
metric tons exported to the United States
54
. This information has both positive and 
negative implications for the hypotheses, and will be explained in the Results and 
Discussion section.  
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Figure 3. Cocaine Production in Colombia:  
2000 - 2007 
Cocaine Produced




Figure 5, as well, represents the expected effect on homicide rates in Colombia in 
relation to U.S. aid under Plan Colombia between 2000 and 2007. Showing an increase 
between 2000 and 2002 (25,000 homicides to 30,000), matching the funding decrease 
during the same period, sufficiently supports the hypotheses
55
.  Homicide rates post-2002 
show a gradual decrease by each fiscal year.  This supports the hypotheses as well, as 
better trained military and law enforcement over time, as well as stronger rule of law in 
the country, will continue even with a static rate of funding year over year. 
 
 
                                                        
55 Biden, Joseph R., and Tess J. Ford. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but 
  Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance: 
  Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
















Figure 4. Estimated Export of Cocaine to the United 
States: 2000 - 2007 
Cocaine Exported to the
U.S.























Figure 5. Homicide Rates in Colombia:  
2000 - 2007 




Figure 6, presenting the kidnapping rates in Colombia between 2000 and 2007, 
showed somewhat unexpected results in the data, having an immediate decline between 
2000 and 2001, and only a small increase from 2001 to 2002, subsequently having a 
gradual decline to minimal rates between 2002 and 2007
56
.  This data, again, supports the 




Results and Discussion 
The data provided in the previous section shows strong support for all three 
hypotheses.  Though this is not sufficient enough evidence to prove the hypotheses, it 
gives strong credence to the argument that the balloon effect is a valid theory, that it can 
cause regional changes, and that the United States plays a part in it.  Again though, it is 
important to reiterate that there are other factors at play that cannot be measured, that 
may also be influencing these changes.  Drug trafficking is very much a business, so if 
cost of production increases significantly, or demand decreases, moving one’s business 
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Figure 6. Kidnapping Rates in Colombia: 
 2000 - 2007 




only makes sense.  Still, the evidence gathered here can support the balloon effect’s 
presence, prevalence, and culpability in Latin America. 
Certain aspects of the data are problematic, however.  Because rates of homicide 
and kidnapping represent the overall rates for Colombia, they cannot be specifically tied 
to drug-related crime. Though one could assume the majority may be drug-related, given 
the prevalence of narcotic trafficking, the data is not 100% reliable in this context. The 
data provided for estimated exportation rates in Figure 4 challenges reliability as well.  
The data itself is problematic because it is based in estimation.  Though these are 
probably very well educated guesses, they are still just estimations and cannot be taken as 
truth. The fact that the data does not fully support the hypotheses is disconcerting, but is 
not necessarily a negative result.  
The primary goal of Plan Colombia from the U.S. perspective was to significantly 
reduce the amount of cocaine that crossed the border into the United States. This data, 
however, showed that it only increased over time.  At first glance, this seems like a bad 
sign for the hypotheses, however, in regards to the balloon effect this is actually a 
positive result.  By showing that cocaine exports increased (if these estimates are to be 
considered accurate), it shows that clamping down on production and exports in a 
specific region, only prompted an increase in another.  Therefore, this data does result in 







 Given the data, and the multiple counternarcotic initiatives without U.S. 
involvement, it is impossible to prove that the U.S. is responsible for introducing the 
balloon effect to Latin America. This part of the hypotheses will remain unproven, 
though it can be supported.  Data developed by the U.N. in response to their own efforts 
showed similar effects --- that by reducing drug-related crime in one area activity would 
increase somewhere else in the surrounding region.  This does not take into account local 
law enforcement practices and regional efforts within Latin America
57
.  In regards to 
culpability, as well as hypothesis three, neither can be proven true for the purposes of this 
chapter. 
 However, the results have shown that it is possible to associate the allocation of 
funding to specific counternarcotic programs in Colombia, with a reduction in drug-
related crimes, followed by an increase in drug-related crime in an area without a major 
security/counternarcotics effort such as the developments in Peru
58
.  This makes it 
reasonable to assume the balloon effect is a very real possibility for the lack of success by 
regional governments in combating the drug trade coming from Latin America. 
 With the current approach, it would be very difficult to ever reach a “victory” 
over the transnational drug trafficking organizations in the region
59
. U.S. policymakers 
must find a way to augment its strategy, because currently, they are simply squeezing the 
air from one side of the balloon to another, hence the recent shift of cocaine production 
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from Colombia to Peru
60
.  Where Plan Colombia failed most was its priority of direct 
action against DTOs in Colombia.  This type of action is only a short-term fix, regardless 
of the balloon effect.  As future security partnerships such as the Mérida Initiative and the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative have shown, community based programs are far more 
effective at reducing crime long-term. These programs promote education and economic 
opportunities previously unavailable to the inhabitants.  Lives of crime are often last 
resorts for people in these communities, and providing them with better opportunities to 
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Research Question: How has the deteriorating security situation in Mexico affected U.S. 
foreign policy in Latin America? 
 
Introduction 
 The United States’ getting involved in another state’s national security efforts is 
not a foreign concept.  Whether it is supplying weapons, equipment, or even training, the 
U.S. is all too familiar with assisting partners in need.  However, few regions have as 
much direct influence on U.S. national security and foreign policy as does Latin America.  
As discussed in Chapter One, one of the largest security partnerships between the United 
States and Latin America began with Plan Colombia
61
.  This saw the flow of billions of 
dollars from the United States to Colombia (only a fraction of Colombia’s input), and one 
of the first major bilateral efforts to combat illicit narcotics production and trafficking, as 
well as drug related crime.  Though the correlation has been heavily debated, the influx 
of illicit trafficking and drug/gang related crime in Mexico and Central America 
following the successes of Plan Colombia was difficult to ignore
62,63
. This led to the 
United States’ second major multilateral effort to combat illicit trafficking and 
transnational criminal organizations, the Mérida Initiative.   
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Originally funded in FY2008, the Mérida Initiative began much differently from 
how it exists today
64
.  Rather than being a bilateral security partnership with Mexico 
alone, it initially included the states of Central America in its efforts as well
65
.  This 
proved to be too much jurisdiction to manage for one security partnership, and it was 
eventually broken up into three separate bilateral and multilateral relationships.  The 
Mérida Initiative became primarily a U.S.-Mexico security partnership (though some 
funding still goes to Central America), the Central American Regional Security Initiative 
(CARSI) manages the security partnerships between the U.S. and its Central America 
partners, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) manages the U.S.’ security 
relationship with Caribbean states. 
At its conception, the Mérida Initiative consisted of four pillars: Disrupting 
Operational Capacity of Organized Crime, Institutionalization Reforms to Sustain the 
Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Mexico (including police, judicial, and 
penal reforms), Creating a 21
st
 Century Border, and Building Strong Resilient 
Communities
66
.  Long-term goals were established with set deadlines of improvement to 
encourage the full cooperation of Mexico’s state and federal governments.  Though, 
while the U.S. played a large part in organizing and funding the Mérida Initiative, it was 
mostly Mexico’s responsibility to enforce the new policies and combat transnational 
organized crime, as well as the corruption and faults in its own system.  This 
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responsibility now falls under President Pena Nieto’s administration, which has taken a 
strong public stance against drug traffickers and transnational organized crime
67
.   
Unlike Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative attempted to establish goals to give 
Mexico long-term benefits.  A strong emphasis was put on proper training, as well as 
allocating the necessary equipment for a strong judicial system
68
.  Reforms in the judicial 
system were heavily broached as well.  This meant reducing corruption, and bringing the 
rate of convictions closer to that of arrests.  The United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration helped train Mexican law enforcement not only how to identify and deal 
with drug traffickers, but also how to be aware of human rights violations
69
.  The goal of 
the Mérida Initiative was not only to assist Mexico with an alarmingly high rate of 
transnational organized crime and drug-related violence, but also to reduce corruption in 
government and establish a strong judicial system that can be maintained long after U.S. 
aid subsides.  This, however, only represents one pillar of the Merida Initiatives primary 
goals.  One of the most important ones to the United States own interests is Pillar 3 – 
Creating a 21
st
 Century Border.  This Pillar is meant to prevent crime spillover from 
occurring at the United States’ southern border. 
 Immigration aside, one of the United States’ primary border security concerns is 
the spillover of drug and gang related crime from Mexico
70,71
.  While other nations may 
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face similar issues of crime spillover from neighboring states, the United States has yet to 
deal with such issues on a large-scale.  Even though the U.S. is attempting to increase 
security and stabilize its partners in Latin America through these bilateral and multilateral 
partnerships, its ultimate goal is to curtail any threats to its own national security.  This 
can be no more evident than in its security relationship with Mexico, the only Latin 
American state with which the U.S. shares a border.  The proximity of Mexico to the 
United States forces it to pay close attention to the movement and activity of 
transnational organized crime, and the fear of spillover forces it to take action. 
 Due to the increased presence of transnational organized crime in Mexico, it was 
only logical for the United States to take some kind of action. This chapter will examine 
if the Mérida Initiative has been successful in preventing crime spillover from Mexico 
occurring in the United States, and will review how the United States responded to this 
threat.  This will entail attempting to establish whether or not the Mérida Initiative was 
developed as a reactive, short-term fix to Mexico’s crime rates and the threat of spillover, 
or if it can have a real long-term effect on Mexico’s security.  For this chapter and the 
remainder of the thesis, the term reactive will mean short-term, narrowly-targeted 
programs to combat an immediate problem. Empirical data will be used to assess the 
levels of spillover from Mexico into the United States in relation to the Mérida Initiative 
funding, while statements and reports made to the United States House of 
Representatives will be used to evaluate U.S. reasoning for developing the Mérida 
Initiative with Mexico. 
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Literature Review 
 While crime spillover between neighboring states is nothing new to the world, the 
United States has yet to face (or at least attempted to deal with) large-scale transborder 
crime.  Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe have all dealt with this issue in some 
form or another in both the past and present.  Susan Woodward’s work on transnational 
organized crime permeating from southeast Europe to some of the region’s major powers 
is an excellent example of wealthy, stable states attempting to deal with crime and 
instability at their borders.  Her work will continue to be referenced throughout this 
chapter as a supporting case study. 
In regards to the United States’ and Mexico’s concerns with increasing crime, 
most peer-reviewed works focus solely on examining the successes and failures of their 
security partnership, rather than the long-term effects of, and reasoning for such a 
relationship on the United States’ part, as well as the level of their involvement.  Of all 
the research conducted on the Mérida Initiative, two works stand out by presenting 
theories applicable to this chapter.  Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristen M. Finklea of the 
Congressional Research Service, express their concern that the United States is purely 
reacting to a fear of the spillover effect, in their work, “U.S.-Mexico Security 
Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond”
72
.  Rather than waiting for large-scale 
crime spillover to occur, Seelke and Finklea argue that the U.S. is acting to prevent 
spillover from occurring at all. This will act as one of the main theories for this chapter. 
 Another prevailing theory on U.S. involvement in Mexico is to create long-term 
stability in the state, and ultimately the region, to reduce the effect of DTOs and 
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transnational organized crime on the United States
73
.  This theory, presented by Brian 
Bow and Arturo Santa Cruz in their work, The State and Security in Mexico: 
Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, argues that the United States is 
looking to establish a stable Mexico and thereby stable region
74
.  Seelke and Finklea 
oppose this theory stating that current U.S. action via the Mérida Initiative is reactive and 
will not be able to maintain long-term stability or prevent spillover from occurring. 
 
Spillover 
 “Spillover” is a term developed to represent crime that is displaced across borders 
from one country into another
75
.  It is not an uncommon phenomenon.  Often, spillover 
can effect an entire region, as has been evident in Latin America.  Another excellent 
example of the spillover effect would be the prevalence and expansion of transnational 
organized crime in southeast Europe
76
.  In her 2004 work, “Enhancing Cooperation 
Against Transborder Crime in Southeast Europe: Is there an Emerging Epistemic 
Community?” Susan Woodward highlights how trafficking from southeast European 
states has effected Europe’s major powers.  This has led to the rise of multiple state-based 
and international anti-trafficking organizations, and some large-scale policy efforts
77
.  
Though it is not a perfect system, as transnational illicit trafficking is still one Europe’s 
major security concerns, the regions major powers have each put their intelligence 
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networks and policymakers to good use.  This has created a network of cooperation, and 
though further collaboration among Europe’s southeastern states will be necessary for 
complete success, Europe has taken significant strides to combat the spillover of crime 
from other countries by attacking its source
78
. 
However, even though it may be a common occurrence in the international 
community, it can be quite difficult to prevent without a significant amount of 
resources
79
.  A state must already have well-established tools such as an intelligence 
apparatus, a large, well-equipped and well-trained law enforcement entity, and significant 
financial capabilities. Programs designed to create new norms require longevity, as well 
as substantial, continuous funding. The U.S. has such resources, and is currently using 
them to prevent the spillover of transnational organized crime and DTOs from Mexico 
into the United States
80
. 
 However, Seelke and Finklea’s work shows that even though the U.S. is 
attempting to instill permanent long-term reforms, the majority of its efforts are reactive.  
They argue that the U.S. saw drastically increasing figures on drug/gang related crime 
(especially in three of the states bordering the U.S.), and deemed it necessary to intervene 
and provide assistance to the Mexican government to combat the problem
81
.  They assert 
that this only temporarily reduces crime.  While it may prevent spillover, a reactive 
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approach such as this to transnational organized crime will only postpone their activities.  
Like previously seen with Plan Colombia, when U.S. funding to combat DTOs stopped, 
the illicit drug trade in neighboring states began to increase dramatically
82
.  In examining 
other cases of wealthy, stable nations combatting transnational organized crime and 
spillover, Seelke and Finklea make it clear in their argument that purely reacting to the 
threat of spillover crime will not solve the problem.  They argue that U.S. foreign policy 
towards Mexico is directly related to crime rates and the possibility of spillover, and thus, 
elicited a program to combat transnational organized crime
83
. However, they assert that 
the nature of the program is not conducive to long-term success, and ultimately, despite 




 The stability theory, presented by Bow and Santa Cruz (2013), argues that U.S. 
action in Mexico will improve security and increase stability in both the state and the 
region
84
.  They assert that efforts to improve the judicial system, reduce human rights 
violations, reduce corruption, and create a well-trained, well-equipped law enforcement 
via the Mérida Initiative can permanently reduce transnational organized crime in 
Mexico
85
.  Contradicting Seelke and Finklea’s theory, Bow and Santa Cruz also maintain 
that these efforts will prevent any spillover from occurring in the future.  Effectively 
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stating that, even if reactive, U.S. efforts to combat transnational organized crime in 
Mexico and prevent spillover will work both immediately and long-term
86
.  They believe 
that funding from the Mérida Initiative, even if unsuccessful at reducing crime rates 
initially, will create a more capable and efficient judicial system in Mexico, and will 
ultimately reduce crime in Mexico and the possibility of spillover into the United States. 
 Bow and Santa Cruz’s work, however, does not address what happens when 
funding for the Mérida Initiative stops.  They assume that the reforms being attempted 
will work, though the deadlines required by the United States are not generous.  If the 
reforms do not reach a certain point, then funding from the U.S. comes to a halt.  
Policymakers on Capitol Hill have continued to address their concerns on Mérida’s 
shortcomings, asserting that funding either needs to stop or drastically increase if 
transnational organized crime is to truly be eradicated
87
. Bow and Santa Cruz do not 
seem to take into account that even though the United States is allocating a significant 
amount of resources to Mexico, once the Mérida Initiative ends, so does the money, 
training, and equipment. 
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 This chapter will emphasize the works of Seelke and Finklea (2013), Bow and 
Santa Cruz (2013), and Sarah Woodward (2004) to guide its progression.  The theories 
developed by Seelke and Finklea and Bow and Santa Cruz have led to the consideration 
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of two hypotheses.  The first will be considered separately from the second.  The two are 
not dependent on one another, and while the first can be tested with empirical data, the 
second is more abstract and will be limited to discussion.  Each hypothesis will be 
examined through the lens of the Merida Initiative.  This will allow each hypothesis to be 
considered under the same case study. 
 
Hypotheses 
1. Spillover crime has been, and will continue to be deterred by the Mérida Initiative 
while funding exists. 
2. The creation of the Mérida Initiative was reactive by the United States, and is not 
conducive to long-term stability. 
 
Methodology 
 Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the steps taken by the United 
States to prevent crime spillover from Mexico.  Due to the proximal nature of their 
relationship, and the means possessed by the United States, they have the ability to act 
against what they may consider to be a threat to national security.  However, reasoning 
for action may hinder the overall effectiveness of the Mérida Initiative. As a finite 
program, limited to a few years rather than decades, Mérida’s ability to establish 
sustainable reforms in Mexico aimed at reducing crime and preventing spillover has been 
brought into question.  This chapter intends to examine the United States’ reasoning, and 
the sustainability of crime reduction and spillover deterrence. 
 35 
 In order to do this properly, multiple documents and theories will be examined in 
conjunction with a dataset used by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  It will 
be necessary to assess and consider each of the relative theories on the United States’ 
security partnership with Mexico. The data has been collected from multiple government 
sources (from both the United States and Mexico) by the GAO, and will be examined 
with accompanying visual representation. The results of this data will be sufficiently 
analyzed in reference to the hypotheses, and the chapter will conclude with an argument 
summary, hypothesis review, and recommendations for future research. 
To properly answer the research question and sufficiently investigate the 
hypotheses, a single dataset, supported by multiple sources, was examined for this 
chapter.  Data from GAO primarily relies on specific figures on DTO-related crime over 
time (in both Mexico and U.S. border states), as well as arrest rates, conviction rates, and 
sentencing
88
.  Data gathered by CRS includes information provided by the Mexican 
government, which includes perceived crime and safety
89
. Though this has value and can 
be used for this chapter, it reduces the reliability of the data.  It is also difficult to gauge 
what is ultimately responsible for the successes or failures of combatting transnational 
organized crime. While the Calderón administration focused primarily on directly 
attacking DTOs in Mexico, Pena Nieto is more concerned with judicial and economic 
reforms, having less immediate results but more long-term success (most likely)
90
.  This 
is not to mention other unrelated factors that could be attributed to reduction of DTO 
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 To track U.S. involvement, Mérida funding was compared to crime rates in 
Mexico, as well as crime rates in U.S. Border States to examine any possible spillover.  
While crime rates in U.S. Border States cannot be directly attributed to spillover, 
comparing them to crime rates in Mexico’s border states could show a correlation.  The 
data gathered will also be shown visually via charts when it is appropriate. 
 
Data 
A report developed by Clare Seelke and Kristen Finklea of the Congressional 
Research Service provided substantial amounts of data on the Mérida Initiative, most 
specifically on funding allocation per fiscal year.  Using this data, represented in Figure 
7, it is possible to compare the United States’ level of assistance (funding allocation), to 
crime rates in both U.S. and Mexican Border States, as well as rates of extradition.  As 
can be seen in Figure 7, though it has spikes, the level of funding from the U.S. to 
Mexico under the Mérida Initiative trends downward from FY2008 to FY2014
92
.  Seelke 
and Finklea (2013) would argue that this is not enough to prevent spillover long-term, 
and permanently reduce the prevalence of transnational organized crime in Mexico.   
This was echoed in a Congressional Hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on 
the Western Hemisphere of the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, in which both Members of Congress and witnesses expressed concerns 
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over the longevity of the Mérida Initiative. Assistant Secretary William Brownfield for 
the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. 
Department of State asserted that there have been clear successes due to Mérida, with 
over 50 senior members of drug trafficking organizations behind bars and over 70,000 
Mexican students receiving civic and ethics education. Clare Seelke argued while 
testifying, however, that Merida was strong enough to break up the large transnational 
criminal organizations in Mexico, but was in no way prepared to deal with the fallout. 
The remnants of gangs began fighting for territorial control, and little effort was made to 
combat these disputes in some states.  This supports hypothesis two– the Merida 
Initiative was a reactive effort by the United States, without a well-enough organized plan 
to deal with combating transnational organized crime. 
 
 
The territorial wars between gangs are largely responsible for the increase in 
























Figure 7. Mérida Initiative Funding Allocation:  




conducted by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Investigations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 2011
93
.  This 
could arguably be viewed as a reactive effort as well, with Congress allocating more 
funding based on Mexico’s deteriorating security and the possibility of spillover.  It 
should be noted that Figure 7 is only a representation of the United States contribution to 
the Mérida Initiative. Mexico’s funding was significantly higher, nearing $50 billion 
dollars
94
.   
As can be seen below in Figure 8, violent crime rates in U.S. border counties 
dropped from 2004 to 2011
95
.  Data dating back to 2004 was included to represent prior 
to the Mérida Initiative’s introduction. This shows two things: first, there may have been 
spillover of transnational organized crime from Mexico already occurring; and second, if 
this is related to spillover then it is possible to relate its reduction to an increase in U.S. 
aid via the Mérida Initiative.  It is impossible to view this data as 100% reliable, as it does 
not take into account who is perpetrating the crime and for what purpose.  However, the 
reduction in violent crimes per 100,000 in border counties between 2008 and 2011 can be 
a correlation to U.S. assistance to Mexico.  There is unfortunately no data on violent 
crimes in U.S. border counties past 2011, which would have been beneficial to compare 
with the increased U.S. support between FY2011 and FY2012.  It is during this period of 
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gang fighting becoming increasingly more prevalent and violent that comparing the two 
statistics would have been very useful. 
 
  
Figure 9 as well shows the immediate success of the Mérida Initiative, increasing 
extraditions drastically from 1995 to 2011, peaking in late 2009.  Data dating back to 
1995 was included to show the gradual growth of extraditions leading up to the Mérida 
Initiative’s introduction. This data shows that law enforcement efforts between the United 
States and Mexico improved, and also correlates to the reduction in violent border crimes 
between 2004 and 2011.  Though the data pertaining to this chapter begins in 2007, it 
































Figure 8. Violent Crimes per 100,000 for all 








For the sake of this paper, extraditions will be considered a part of the United 
States deterrence, and as an aid to Mexico’s judicial system.  Extraditions generally occur 
when the United States wants to prosecute someone they believe to have committed a 
crime in the United States, but then fled south to Mexico
96
. This level of cooperation 
between the U.S. and Mexico could contribute to the reduction in violent crimes 
committed in U.S. Border States, if it could be assumed the crimes were related to the 
spillover effect.  Assistant Secretary William Brownfield echoed the success of these 
efforts along with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, John Feeley, stating that committing 
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Figure 9. Extraditions from Mexico to the United 
States: 1995 - 2011 
Extraditions
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a crime and then fleeing across the border only stalls justice
97
. They asserted that strong 
cooperation on extraditions could significantly reduce spillover
98
. 
This, however, does not correlate well with the data presented in Figure 10, 
which shows the number of attacks on U.S. Border Patrol agents between 2006 and 
2012
99
.   Data going back to 2006 was used to show the growth of assaults prior the 
Mérida Initiative’s implementation. While there was a sharp increase in assaults from 
2006 to 2008, a steady decline began in 2008 with a sharp decline from 2010 to 2012
100
.  
While the data shows a positive trend, it cannot be directly correlated to U.S. Mérida 
Initiative funding.  One could argue that this is the result of programs finally taking 
effect, as was mentioned in a Mérida Congressional Hearing in 2013, however, this is 
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Results & Discussion 
 The data presented shows how the United States tried to assist Mexico in 
combatting transnational organized crime, and prevent spillover from coming across U.S. 
borders.  Though not all data supported the hypotheses, it is clear that while the Mérida 
Initiative received funding from the U.S. there was less spillover crime than without 
funding. Surprisingly, it even showed that there might already be spillover occurring due 
to transnational organized crime crossing the border from Mexico into the United States.  
However, without much data going past 2012, it is currently impossible to evaluate the 
long-term effects of the Mérida Initiative (and U.S. involvement) on DTOs, transnational 
organized crime, and spillover.  It is safe to say though that while funding exists crime 
spillover from Mexico will be deterred by the United States, supporting the first 
hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis is less likely to be proven with data. However, testimony 























Figure 10. Assaults Against U.S. Border Patrol 




the steps taken were reactions to the deteriorating security in Mexico, and were intended 
to prevent spillover into the United States
102,103
.  While Mérida established long-term 
goals with many reforms, there have been many questions about their longevity and 
sustainability, due to the limited nature of the Mérida Initiative, and the demanding 
deadlines set by the United States Congress.  Unfortunately, these questions will only be 
answered as time progresses. 
The statements made by Assistant Secretary Brownfield and Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary John Feeley as witnesses to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
support the second hypothesis and Seelke and Finklea’s argument that much of U.S. 
action was reactive. However, they both assert that the programs being established under 
the Mérida Initiative are sustainable, and will improve upon Mexican security long-term, 
supporting Bow and Santa Cruz’s argument.  As mentioned before, this aspect can only 
be assessed as time passes and U.S. funding for the Mérida Initiative reaches its end. 
 
Conclusion 
 It’s clear from the existence of the Mérida Initiative alone than an increase in 
transnational organized criminal activity in Mexico correlates to an increase in assistance 
from the United States.  However, how the United States chooses to respond is what 
matters most.  Taking reactive steps is not enough, and cannot be sustainable for long-
term improvements. The Mérida Initiative was not exactly a failure.  It succeeded by 
                                                        
102 Has Mérida Evolved?: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee On the Western Hemisphere and the 
  Subcommittee On Oversight and Investigations of the Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of 
  Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2011. 
103 U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: An Overview of the Merida Initiative 2008-Present: Hearing before 
  the Subcommittee On the Western Hemisphere of the Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of 
  Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, May 23, 2013. 
 44 
doing what it was intended, prevented any further spillover crime, and helped Mexico 
combat its current security crisis.  Where it failed was by not fully supporting its 
ambitions. The Mérida Initiative has attempted to create programs that will reform the 
justice system and reduce government corruption, but these efforts take time and the 
deadlines for improvement imposed by the United States seem unlikely to be met.  If 
funding is cut off, what then does Mexico do to combat the problem? 
 Other efforts such as community building are likewise excellent for long-term 
sustainability. These programs provide educational, recreational, and vocational 
opportunities to the youths of at-risk communities, however, they are vastly underfunded 
compared to efforts directly combating DTO-related crime, and have a very limited 
lifespan.  These programs need to be as much a priority as the more public, crime-
fighting programs. As can be seen in Chapter Three, one of the Mérida Initiative’s spurs, 
the Central America Regional Security Initiative, put a significant amount of emphasis on 
the importance of these programs, with clear benefits. 
 There also needs to be a continuous effort to combat the growth and expansion of 
transnational organized crime in Mexico by the United States.  Mexican states like 
Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas cannot continue to be ignored.  If the United 
States is concerned about its own national security, and the possible spillover of crime 
across its southern border, then it needs to pursue both preemptive and preventative 
measures, rather than continuing to react when crime reaches levels unmanageable for 
Mexico alone.  Assistance, however, cannot be limited to temporary programs and 
reforms.  It must be proactive and enduring.  With the Mérida Initiative concluding, the 
 45 
United States needs to develop a long-term strategy with Mexico in order to permanently 
















































Research Question: How have Central American and Caribbean states been influenced 








 Since the United States became heavily involved with combatting Drug 
Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in Latin America, security in the region has been 
nothing but progressive.   With pressure being put on criminal organizations in South 
America via Plan Colombia, and in Mexico via the Mérida Initiative, more and more 
DTOs have been reorganizing within Central America and the Caribbean
104
.  The 
increase of drug-related crime over recent years has made the security situation in the 
region one of the most volatile and complicated in Latin America.  While each 
government took its own approach in combatting the problem, there was little success. 
Guatemala and Honduras both employed the military for public security and policing 
efforts.  Belize and El Salvador attempted to broker truces between rival gangs.  Some 
countries even considered decriminalizing drugs altogether
105
.  
 However, social conditions, weak and corrupt governments, and the lack of a 
combined regional effort have all hindered attempts to improve security in Central 
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.  The presence of extreme poverty and inequality in these countries leaves 
few options for the youth populations of Central America.  Outside of emigration, many 
are susceptible to lives of crime
107
.  This makes most state efforts in combating DTOs in 
the region futile, as they are not attacking the problem at its source, nor are they fully 
addressing the transnational presence of said organizations. 
 Assistance from the United States originally came in FY2008 in the form of the 
Mérida Initiative, a Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance package
108
.  As 
it became clear this was not enough to manage the growing security crisis, the Central 
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) was made into its own entity, with five 
primary goals: 
1. Create safe streets for the citizens of the region. 
2. Disrupt the movement of criminals and contraband to, within, and among the 
nations of Central America. 
3. Support the development of strong, capable, and accountable Central 
American governments. 
4. Establish effective state presence, services, and security in communities at 
risk. 
5. Foster enhanced levels of coordination and cooperation among the nations of 





Unlike the individual efforts of Central America’s states, however, the US took a 
multilayered approach to security in the region.  While they did provide much needed 
equipment, training, and technical assistance to law enforcement, the US also sought to 
address the underlying conditions contributing to the burgeoning drug-related crime rates 
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.  This was something that had not previously been attempted by 
Central American countries. 
 CARSI differed from previous efforts by Central American states in two ways. 
First, it supported community-based programs designed to address the economic and 
social conditions leaving Central American youths and their communities vulnerable
111
.  
While CARSI primarily funded law enforcement and justice sector programs/reforms, it 
also sought to provide at-risk youths with alternatives to the drug trade. These included 
educational, vocational, and recreational activities previously unavailable to many 
communities in Central America
112
. 
Second, it approached the problem from a regional standpoint, rather than each 
state attempting their own security programs.  One of CARSI’s stronger aspects was 
building off the foundation of security efforts already in place by individual states.  This 
generally consisted of supplying interdiction law enforcement/military units with much 
needed equipment, as well as training from US agencies such as the Drug Enforcement 
Administration
113
.  This training was most often associated with interdiction strategies 
and procedures, as well as how to operate the newly-allocated equipment.  It also 
included human rights and anti-corruption training
114
.  
Since FY2008 $803.6 million has been appropriated by Congress through both 
Mérida and CARSI.  As can be seen in Figure 11, the majority of funding since its 
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inception to 2008 has been allocated to Guatemala, while Nicaragua and Belize have 
received the smallest allocations.  A regional security fund accounts for 19.6 percent of 
funding allocations, used to support both regional programs and as an emergency fund if 
needed. The Obama Administration has requested an additional $130 million for CARSI 
in FY2015
115
.   
 
 
Where Central America has become a hub of DTOs in Latin America, however, 
the Caribbean has become the gateway.  Perfectly situated between South America (home 
to the world’s largest cocaine producers), and North America and Europe (home to the 
world’s largest cocaine consumers), the Caribbean is a major transit zone for DTOs and 
illicit narcotics
116
.  To support the efforts of the Mérida Initiative and CARSI, a new 
security partnership was created for the Caribbean between the United States, member 
states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Dominican Republic.  The 
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Figure 11. CARSI Funding Allocation by Country:  
FY2008 - FY2012 
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Caribbean Basin Security Initiative’s (CBSI) primary goals are to reduce illicit trafficking 
in the region, while also promoting improved citizen security and social justice
117
. 
 CBSI acts as the most preventative effort of all U.S. security partnerships in Latin 
America.  While many of the same issues present in Central America (poverty, high 
unemployment, social inequality, and inadequate criminal justice systems) exist there, 
DTOs have yet to base operations in the Caribbean
118
. For the most part, it acts as a 
trafficking gateway to North America and Europe.   This largely makes the efforts of 
CBSI to prevent drug-related crime from reaching the levels present in Central America, 
while interdicting as many trafficking shipments as possible.  Even though Caribbean 
states have a long history of economic development, significant funding is being 
allocated by each state to participate in the U.S.-designed CBSI
119
. From FY2010 to FY 
2012, the U,S. allocated $203 million for CBSI activities to the Bahamas, the Eastern 
Caribbean (Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines), Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and the Dominican Republic
120
. 
 This, however, can be a large burden on states without the resources to match a 
hegemon such as the United States.  While security in Central America and the Caribbean 
may improve from these efforts, how do these partnerships affect other aspects of the 
smaller Central American and Caribbean states? This chapter seeks to answer the 
question - do asymmetrical relationships between hegemons (the United States) and 
smaller states (Central America and the Caribbean) work, and can they benefit all parties 
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involved for a long partnership?  The United States has been in relationships with Latin 
American countries for decades, but has its involvement truly benefited the region?  
 The goal of this chapter is to examine not only CARSI and CBSI’s effect on 
security for the partner countries involved, but also their effect on aspects of statehood 
that are not a part of the two security partnerships.  Asymmetrical relationships between 
hegemons and weaker powers have seen both successes and failures. China has had a 
long-standing relationship with South Korea that has benefited both countries 
significantly, whereas others, such as the United States and Bolivia, have ended with 
significant damage to the smaller state
121,122
. Often, however, these relationships end with 
the hegemon taking advantage of a power disparity.   This chapter will evaluate whether 
the United States regional security partnerships with Central America and the Caribbean 
work to the benefit or the detriment of the partner states involved. 
 
Literature Review 
 There has been a significant amount of literature produced on the asymmetrical 
relationship between a hegemon and a smaller power.  These types of relationships are 
becoming increasingly common, and their true effects are being examined in depth.  
Generally, scholars want to know who benefits the most from these relationships, and if 
they are sustainable long-term?  These questions have created fairly polarizing opinions, 
leaving few to argue they are indeterminable.  The two theories being reviewed for this 
chapter were developed by Kenneth Lehman (1999) and Heungkyu Kim (2012).   
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 The first theory, developed by Kenneth Lehman, argues that asymmetrical 
relationships often end up harming the weaker of the two states.  Lehman believes that, 
ultimately, the needs of the hegemon will always outweigh the needs of the partner 
country.  He cites the bilateral relationship between the United States and Bolivia as its 
example, primarily focusing on the collapse of Bolivia’s tin market.  The second theory 
being reviewed, developed by Heungkyu Kim, states that asymmetrical bilateral 
relationships can be beneficial to both countries involved, and have long-term 
sustainability.  He believes this does not happen by chance, however, but that it requires 
both states to view the relationship as a positive-sum game (especially the hegemon).  
 
Needs of the State 
In his book Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership, Kenneth D. 
Lehman studies the relationship between the United States and Bolivia, and its long-term 
adverse effects.  While the two states had a flourishing partnership through much of the 
twentieth century, the needs of the hegemon ultimately outweighed the needs of the 
smaller state.  Bolivia was the United States largest supplier of tin for many years, until 
the U.S. decided to increase its recycling efforts, and switched to importing aluminum
123
.  
Aluminum has a much higher rate of material return during the recycling process; 
however, Bolivia had no significant aluminum deposits to export, and no new market for 
selling tin
124
.   
                                                        
123 Lehman, Kenneth Duane, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership. Athens:  
  University of Georgia Press, 1999. 
124 Ibid 
 53 
Lehman argues that this led to the collapse of the tin market in Bolivia, and sent 
much of its workforce into unemployment and poverty
125
.  Many of these workers turned 
to cocaine production and the illicit narcotics trade, ultimately turning Bolivia into one of 
South America’s largest cocaine producers, and one of the United States’ major suppliers.  
Because of this, Lehman’s theory states that the asymmetrical relationship between a 
hegemon and weaker power will be beneficial for as long as the hegemon’s needs are 
met
126
.  This means that in relationships such as these, the needs of the weaker state will 
always come second and are thus, negligible to the hegemon
127
. Lehman’s theory is 
supported by June Francis and Gary Mauser (2011), who assert in their work, "Collateral 
Damage: the 'War on Drugs', and the Latin America and Caribbean Region: Policy 
Recommendations for the Obama Administration," that the United States relationship 






Heungkyu Kim presents an opposing argument and theory in his work, “Enemy, 
Homager, or Equal Partner?: Evolving Korea-China Relations.” Kim reviews the long 
relationship between China and South Korea, and recounts the successes and failures 
throughout its history.  However, Kim ultimately says that the relationship is both 
important and beneficial for the two countries, even though China is the regional 
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hegemon, and South Korea is a weaker state by comparison
129
.  Though some scholars 
question the continued strength of this relationship, Kim asserts that Korea-China 
relations will continue to grow
130,131
. 
Kim’s theory states that this type of long-term relationship between a hegemon 
and weaker state is possible by viewing it as positive-sum game
132
.  As long as South 
Korea and China continue to grow their shared opportunities they will continue to have a 
successful bilateral relationship
133
.  It is only threatened by focusing the relationship on 
one issue.  He states that if Korea becomes too concerned with its security, neglecting 
other aspects of its relationship with China, it could throw a wrench in their partnership. 
Kim concedes that this may not be a perfect partnership, but can still be prosperous rather 
than detrimental
134
.  This theory is supported by the works of Roberto Russell and Juan 
Gabriel Tokatlain (2011), and Gabriel Marcella (2013), who assert that Latin America 




Theory and Hypothesis 
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 This chapter will emphasize the works of Lehman (1999) and Kim (2012) to 
guide its focus and progression.  The theories developed by Lehman and Kim have led to 
the consideration of one hypothesis.  Kenneth Lehman’s theory will support the 
hypothesis, along with the collected works in Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the 
Turn of the Millennium, and Heungkyu Kim’s theory will oppose the hypothesis. The 
hypothesis will be tested by analyzing empirical data gathered on this chapter’s case 
studies (CARSI and CBSI), and will be reviewed in the final sections of the chapter.  
CARSI and CBSI will be the only case studies reviewed.  
 
Hypothesis 
1. U.S. involvement via the Central American Regional Security Initiative and the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative caused states with already struggling 
economies to worsen. 
 
Methodology 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of a hegemon on smaller, less 
powerful states.  This is done through the lens of CARSI and CBSI as case studies for 
how the goals of a hegemon (U.S.) may take precedence over its partners’ in an 
asymmetrical relationship.  In this relationship, the United States aimed to reduce crime 
and damage DTOs in the region, largely due to their transnational presence and status as 
suppliers to the U.S.  However, it is unclear if this pursuit has ultimately been more 
harmful than good for the partner countries involved.  This chapter will review other 
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aspects of statehood for the countries of Central America and the Caribbean, and how 
they have been influenced by their security partnership with the United States. 
 To do this, individual states were selected to represent the United States’ 
influence on state matters other than security.  For Central America and CARSI, the three 
most crime-ridden states were chosen to represent the region.  These include, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, also known as the Northern Triangle
137
.  These 
states were chosen because they are often the three most discussed states in relations to 
security in Central America (of those supported by CARSI), while also having three of 
the weaker economies in Central America
138
.  For the Caribbean and CBSI, the two most 
funded states were chosen.  These include Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad 
and Tobago was also chosen to become a regional law enforcement-training hub by the 




The data used in this chapter was collected by the U.S. Department of State, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, and participating partner countries, and is 
presented through various agencies.  Data on current U.S. foreign assistance trends to 
Latin America, as well as the current funding status and efficacy of CARSI and CBSI are 
presented by the U.S. Congressional Research Service.  Country-specific data gathered 
by the U.S. Department of State, as well as participating Central American states, is 
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 This section will use the collected data to analyze the relation between U.S. 
security partnerships CARSI and CBSI, and the economies of the Northern Triangle, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  In Central America, Honduras received the largest 
amount of assistance from the United States, amounting to 17% of CARSI’s funding 
from FY2008 to FY 2012
140
.  However, as part of this relationship, Honduras was 
required to allocated significant funding from its own budget to security efforts designed 
by the United States.  Figure 12 shows Honduras’ debt as a percent of its gross domestic 
product from FY2010 to FY2013. In three years, government debt increased from 30 to 
nearly 40 percent of GDP
141
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 While this cannot be directly attributed to the requirements of the United States 
and CARSI, it is not the only Central American state to suffer from a worsening economy 
during CARSI funding.  Honduras has seen an improvement in financial freedoms over 
recent years; however, much of its public debt has been attributed to poor public 
spending habits (of which CARSI can be attributed)
142
.  
However, Figure 13 shows the opposite trend in Guatemala’s GDP per capita 
from FY2008 to FY2013
143
.  Rather than showing a negative trend like Honduras, 
Guatemala’s GDP per capita grew from just under $5000 to over $7000 in five years
144
.  
This shows that the security relationship between the United States and Guatemala may 
have actually benefited the Guatemalan economy, rather than harmed it.  This could be 
attributed to greater employment opportunities provided via CARSI, as well as improved 
business opportunities following the overall reduction of drug-related crime.  There are, 
however, multiple factors that could contribute to such an increase.  Over the past decade 
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Guatemala has seen improvements in trade, investment, and business freedom, all of 
which could contribute to a flourishing economy
145
.  This data does not support the 




El Salvador showed similar trends to Guatemala, as can be seen below in Figure 
14.  From 2010 to 2014, the Salvadoran unemployment rate dropped steadily from over 7 
percent to under 6
146
.  This continues to show the possible benefits a security partnership 
with the United States may have on a nation’s economy. Though it may be unrelated, this 
could possibly be attributed to the increase in security related jobs, as well as the 
educational and vocational training programs developed under CARSI.  Reasons outside 
of CARSI for the decreasing unemployment rate could be the free trade agreement with 
the United States, and the consistently growing business and investment freedoms 
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available to Salvadoran citizens
147
. This data also does not support the hypothesis, but 




Interestingly, when compared to homicide and crime victimization rates, CARSI 
has been more successful at stimulating the economies of Central America’s Northern 
Triangle.  Figure 15 shows homicide rates in the Northern Triangle from FY2007 to FY 
2012.  During that time, the only state with a noticeable decline in homicides was El 
Salvador, going from 59 per 100,000 inhabitants down to 40 (though peaking at above 70 
in 2009 and 2011)
148
.  Guatemala’s decrease in homicide rates is negligible, reducing 
from 42 per 100000 down to 40.  Honduras, however, rose from 50 per 100000 in 
FY2007 to 90 per 100000 in 2012
149
.  This data was unexpected and shows that CARSI 
has been more successful at reducing unemployment rates than it has reducing homicides. 
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 Figure 16 shows similar results to Figure 15, indicating that crime rates in the 
Northern Triangle remained high.  In 2011 over one-third of people interviewed in 
Guatemala reported someone in their household had been the victim of a crime
150
.  32% 
of Hondurans reported at least one household victim, and 28.5% did the same in El 
Salvador
151
.  This continues to show that the security efforts of CARSI may have been 
less successful than its community-based programs. 
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 The partner countries of CBSI, however, have shown less positive results.  
Trinidad and Tobago was given the most responsibility under CBSI, receiving a large 
portion of U.S. assistance, as well as being designated the regional security partnerships 
training hub for all law enforcement in the region
152
.  Figure 17 shows Trinidad and 
Tobago’s government debt as a percentage of GDP from FY2009 to FY2014
153
.  This 
data shows that Trinidad and Tobago’s debt significantly increased during that time 
period, rising from 14 percent to above 40
154
.  While it may be attributed to other factors, 
this shows that the fiscal responsibility CBSI placed on Trinidad and Tobago may have 
been extremely detrimental to its economy.  While they have had increasing trade and 
fiscal freedoms open over the past decade, limited market openness and poor regulatory 
efficiency are often cited as significant detriments to Trinidad and Tobago’s economy
155
. 
This could be another explanation outside of CBSI. This data supports both the Lehman 
theory, as well as the hypothesis. 
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As can be seen below in Figure 18, Jamaica showed similar results to Trinidad 
and Tobago.  This data shows Jamaica’s unemployment rate from 2010 through 2014.  
Beginning at an 11 percent unemployment rate, it has increased to nearly 15 percent in 
2014
156
.  Again, while this cannot be directly attributed to the efforts and funding 
requirements of CBSI, it shows that Jamaica’s economy has suffered since CBSI took 
effect in 2010. Factors contributing to this rise outside of CBSI could very well be what it 
is trying to combat.  Government corruption, poor rule of law, and limited financial 
freedoms are often cited as reasons for Jamaica’s poor economy and rising 
unemployment rate
157
.  This data supports the hypothesis as well as Lehman’s theory. 
 It should be noted that while the efforts of CARSI took effect, the unemployment 
rate of El Salvador dropped significantly, while Jamaica’s unemployment rate only 
increased during CBSI.  It is yet undetermined as to what this could be attributed, but 
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possibly it is the purely security based approach of CBSI versus the security and 




Results and Discussion 
 Overall, the data has shown that CARSI may have actually benefited the 
economies of Central America’s states, despite not being as successful at reducing drug-
related crime as intended.  CBSI-related data, however, has shown that it has significantly 
hampered the economies of some of the Caribbean partner states.  These results were 
unexpected and conflict with one another. However, as each was contained within the 
individual regions/partnerships, the results can be attributed to the design of each 
program.  
 Unlike CBSI, CARSI took a multilayered approach to combating the already 
devastating security situation in Central America.  Rather than just focusing on 
improving law enforcement and social justice programs, CARSI also worked from the 
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.  This can explain why the unemployment rate in El Salvador 
decreased, and the GDP per capita in Guatemala increased despite the lack of success in 
reducing drug-related crime.  CBSI, however, had no such community-based programs.  
Its efforts were purely security focused, creating an interdiction network between the 
Caribbean states, dramatically increasing law enforcement training, and security-related 
funding for each state involved.  This can explain why economies of the examined 
Caribbean states have suffered so much since CBSI took effect. Rather than build 
security from the ground up, working on community-based programs to prevent at-risk 
youths and communities from participating in the drug trade, CBSI has largely been 
focused on interdiction. This shows that an asymmetrical relationship between a hegemon 
and smaller nations can be successful, however, it requires much more than a simple to 
fix to a common problem.  The needs and goals of all states involved must be taken into 
account.  This data can confirm as much as possible the hypothesis when related to 
CARSI, however, it cannot when related to CBSI. 
 
Conclusion 
 The relationship between a hegemon and weaker state will almost always leave 
the power in the control of the hegemon. However, that does not mean the relationship 
will end to the detriment of the weaker power.  The examples of the Central America 
Regional Security Initiative and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative have shown two 
different approaches and outcomes of this type of relationship.  Rather than focus solely 
on its own goals, the United States took a multilayered approach with CARSI, and 
                                                        
158 Meyer, Peter J., and Clare Ribando Seelke. 2014. "Central America Regional Security Initiative: 
  Background and Policy Issues for Congress." Congressional Research  Service: Issue Brief 1-38. 
 66 
included the needs of the individual states.  Instead of focusing entirely on law 
enforcement and criminal justice reforms, CARSI used community-based programs to 
give at-risk youths other options than the drug trade. During this time, the unemployment 
rate of El Salvador dropped significantly, and the GDP per capita of Guatemala grew 
year over year.  The immediate results on drug-related crime were less successful, 
however, the long term results of this partnership will likely show a substantial reduction 
in drug-related crime, as well a strong, growing economy (as long as CARSI funding and 
programs continue).  
 This continues to show that community-based programs can greatly benefit the 
partner countries involved in these multilateral security relationships.  Though there was 
success in Plan Colombia, the sustainability of it is in question because it only combated 
the problem head on, and did not focus on any community building efforts.  The Mérida 
Initiative made some efforts to invest at-risk communities in Mexico; however, they were 
given far too little funding over far too little time.  These programs need to be a priority. 
They are the foundation of long-term sustainability, and must be viewed as such when 
creating future partnerships. 
 Efforts must be made in the design of CARSI, rather than that of CBSI, which 
focused solely on law enforcement and interdiction capabilities in the region.  CBSI was 
designed to be a preventative effort. Drug-related crime had not yet directly affected the 
region outside of being a major trafficking waypoint. However, by not taking the bottom-
up approach of CARSI, and relying so heavily on funding updated security practices and 
programs, the long-term success of CBSI may be limited.  The economies of Trinidad 
and Tobago and Jamaica show that they have already declined since CBSI took effect.  If 
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this trend continues, CBSI may be more detrimental to the Caribbean than beneficial.  It 
ultimately comes down to how the hegemon develops and manages the pillars of the 
partnership.  If it is designed solely towards the goals and needs of the hegemon, the 
relationship will likely fail and be harmful to the partner countries.  However, if it is 
designed to take into account the needs and goals of all states involved, it has the 




















 U.S. security efforts in Latin America have largely been unsuccessful.  While 
some immediate goals of the programs have been met, long-term sustainability, and a 
lack of long-term commitment from the United States has hindered efforts to improve 
stability.  This has also damaged some relationships along the way, as countries feel less 
trust with the United States because of it.  To improve security and regional stability for a 
longer period than the length of these programs, the United States needs to move away 
from reactive efforts.  The Central America Regional Security Initiative was the most 
forward thinking of the four, incorporating programs for at-risk communities and youths.  
While Mérida made similar efforts, the deadlines for improvement were too demanding 
to create any longevity.  
These kinds of programs need to become the foundation of security partnerships, 
at least those in Latin America.  Most people involved with DTOs do not seek out a life 
of crime, but have little other alternatives.  Introducing educational, recreational, 
employment, and economic opportunities into at-risk communities is the basis for long-
term success and sustainability.  Combating the problem head-on is necessary as well, as 
citizen security is paramount to the equation, but even if those efforts succeed, they will 
not last unless the youths of at-risk communities have other opportunities in front of 
them.  
One of the glaring problems facing security partnerships such as these is the 
demand of the drug trade. The U.S.’ illicit narcotics market is one of the most profitable 
in the world, and as long as it exists, there will be an organization attempting to meet the 
demand. U.S. security partnerships in Latin America may not be able to eliminate a drug 
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market in the United States, but they can go a long way to eliminating the supply, and 
creating a sustainable citizen security in the region. 
 The United States needs to be a full partner with Latin American states, and not 
just a supplier.  This means increased training programs and collaborations between law 
enforcement and departments of justice, as well as programs outside of security related 
issues.  Job-training and increased employment opportunities could go a long way to 
improving both the economic and security situations in many of these states.  If the 
United States is going to commit to helping these countries, it needs to be a full effort. 
Partial, reactive responses to rising crime rates do not eliminate the problem, and are 
ultimately a waste of taxpayer dollars.  
 Further research must be conducted on the long-term effects of these programs 
once they are no longer in effect.  For example, it is currently difficult to even fully gauge 
the legacy of Plan Colombia, as a supplemental initiative, the Colombia Strategic 
Development Initiative which has picked up where Plan Colombia left off.  It is 
necessary to understand the influence of these programs on the partner countries and the 
region as much as possible, so the mistakes made can be avoided in the future.  The 
United States needs to create better measures to understand how the programs are 
working and what effect they are having in Latin America, and they need to reevaluate 
their overall strategy in the region.  Latin America is one of the most important regions to 
the United States. With one of our largest trade partners and largest suppliers of oil, 
creating long-term stability in the region can only benefit the United States.  It is vital to 
create a new sustainable, strategic effort with long-term programs and goals if stability is 
ever to become a reality. 
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 Additionally, this thesis can be used for comparison against past, present, and 
future security partnerships, regardless of the partners involved.  Understanding the key 
to success is of the utmost importance.  Future research could be conducted examining 
the successes and failures of U.S. security partnerships in Latin America against those of 
other states such as China and South Korea.  Multilateral security partnerships have 
incredible potential, but have yet to see it fully realized.  There are myriad opportunities 
to understand the value and effectiveness of security partnerships through further 
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